Teoria identităţii actului material („same physical act doctrine”) în jurisprudenţa statului american Illinois - Acta Universitatis Sapientiae

Acta Univ. Sapientiae, Legal Studies, Special Issue (2023) 11–38

DOI: 10.47745/AUSLEG.2023.12.X.02

The “Same Physical Act Doctrine” in the Jurisprudence of the American State of Illinois

Abstract. If in the European systems the problem of delimiting the contest of crimes from the contest of qualifications finds a solution by appealing to four important principles (speciality, subsidiarity, absorption, and alternativity), moving away from the European continent, the same problem was solved in the system of the United States of America by calling on the double jeopardy principle and the lesser included offence rule.

Through the present study, we do not intend to address in a general way the solution of the qualification contest in the American system, but rather we mean to bring into discussion a jurisprudential solution that crystallized at the level of the state of Illinois, which substantially simplifies things.

In essence, we will see that the contest of qualifications could come into conflict only with the real contest of crimes, while, from the perspective of the ideal contest, the applicable criminal rules are considered incompatible from the very beginning. This is due to the application of a rule developed through jurisprudence, called the “one-act, one-crime doctrine”, or „same physical act doctrine”.

Keywords: Illinois, “one-act, one-crime doctrine”, same physical act doctrine, double jeopardy, lesser included offence, People v. Schlenger, Carter