



The ‘Europe Idea’ and the European Civilian Crisis Management. The Evolution and Development of the Civilian Crisis Management in the EU

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Abstract. Public support for the European foreign policy and crisis management inside Europe is high. The crisis management is said to be the field where the development of the EU's foreign policy can be perceived in the most expressive way. But is there any sense in having a Common Security and Defence Policy at all? How could an economic entity become a political community as well? Most of all, is there any connection between the ‘Europe idea’ and the civil crisis management? The author tries to deliver his views in the current essay. However, besides giving a short overview of the history of the EU's civil crisis management, this essay also portrays how the history of the European civil crisis management connected to the European integration and the idea of Europe over the years. The crisis of the Eurozone is also an opportunity which can improve other parts of the European integration like civil crisis management. In the author's opinion, it is worth following this path.

Keywords: ‘Europe idea,’ common foreign and security policy, civil crisis management, integration.

Introduction

This essay – despite its title – does not summarize the history of the EU's civil crisis management in the first place. The reason is that the mentioned topic has already been elaborated in depth by others in the literature; thus, the content is available for anyone who is interested in it. The current document will contain rather ‘flashes’ which followed the idea of the European unity, by now through the development of the co-operation of the EU foreign policy in this area.

I am convinced that there are no coincidents. Therefore, it did not happen accidentally either that, out of an economic community, such a capacity expanded which protects European values in countries beyond the EU borders,

being potential candidates for EU membership and also in far-off Asian or African countries which will never belong to the EU. However, it is without doubt that in the field of civil crisis management lots of self-explanation problems exist. Many times, it is not completely clear what the European Union expects with launching a certain civil crisis management mission in the affected area (Jacobs 2011: 2, 3; Mirelingen-Ostraikaute 2006: 141; Juncos 2007: 70). In spite of these facts, the civil crisis management capacity of the EU showed a definite improvement in the last decade and became a significant cohesive factor in my opinion.

This study does not undertake to review the founding and amending treaties besides the changes adopted at the EU summits. This essay rather aims at introducing how the idea of the unified Europe has appeared and developed in the history of the EU civil crisis management.

1. Robert Schuman and the Civil Crisis Management?

Robert *Schuman* was predetermined for the creation of the united Europe by his whole life and political career.¹ Although his name is first of all connected with the foundation of the European Coal and Steel Community, his perceptions about the future Europe were far beyond his period and also that of ours. Schuman's outstanding virtue lies in that even after the two world 'burns' he was able to initiate peacemaking with the old enemy, Germany ('Vergebung statt Vergeltung'), and start a completely new process, the European integration.² He saw it rightly that the European peace can be established by a European federation (Schuman 1991: 17, 120), but the European integration can be created only step by step. This unity can be achieved through common successes, results which generate solidarity between the members, based on Schuman's opinion (Schuman: 18). Such kind of tool and capacity is the EU's civil crisis management capacity, in my eyes. The common successes achieved in this field can help to create the European identity which they tried to bring into being, e.g. by the common currency, the European citizenship, the Schengen area and the Erasmus Programme until now. The civil crisis management missions and their results also carry in themselves the opportunity for the member states to recognize the values to be protected commonly.

The civil crisis management confronts the member states with such problems and threats, which have effect on all of them and which need a common action, carrying, therefore, the possibility of a common success story – this is the real

1 However, Schuman's reconciliation policy was first of all based on his faith in God (Elting 1997: 4–17).

2 This was expressed by Francois Mitterrand more precisely (Schuman 1991: 15). The foundation of the European Coal and Steel Community also had a more practical reason, namely to avoid war with establishing the international control of the necessary raw materials (Schuman: 133).

point of the European soul (Schuman: 33). I feel really appropriate what Walter *Hallstein* said once by stating that the member states can react to future problems only commonly because these problems affect all of us.³ To put it another way, as Schuman remarked: 'Peace as well as safety have become indivisible' (Schuman: 39). In the frame of the civil crisis management, the member states realize that the problems have to be solved by joint efforts. Furthermore, Schuman has properly highlighted that Europe needs to act quickly regarding the building up of the European unity (unities) because the failure of the UN is getting more and more obvious (Schuman: 119). The EU crisis management – considering its set of tools – means an absolutely new dimension of the civil crisis management in general, exceeding the frame of the UN missions.⁴ To solve the new kind of crisis, the EU's wide range of tools seems to be the most suitable way.

The significance of the crisis management lies in what is stressed both by the European Security Strategy and Schumann: peace can be preserved by tools which are in proportion to the possible threats (Schuman: 159).⁵ Building up a rule of law or a public administration, or solving ethnic tensions can not be executed (only) by military forces. For this purpose, the tools of the civil crisis management and the synergy of the civilian-military crisis management ability appear to be the right 'weapon'.

2. The Pleven Plan and the Western European Union

According to some theories, the European integration was determined to turn into a common foreign and security policy.⁶ However, without a doubt, the beginning of the European integration was not about the united Europe as a civil power; moreover, the founding treaties did not even contain relevant regulations. Notwithstanding, it has to be highlighted that, for example, due to the opinion of Francois *Duchene*, it was an intention already at the beginning of the integration to establish a real, civil power (Gazdag 2005: 43).

Keeping in mind that the so-called Pleven Plan belongs to the prehistory of the European military crisis management, it is not detailed in the current

3 'Europe shares a lot of things: those memories, which are called history, those performances, which it can be proud of and those events, which it is ashamed of, its happinesses and its sufferings and, last but not least, its tomorrows.' (Kecskés 2005: 19)

4 A lot has changed since the first UN mission (1948).

5 According to the European Security Strategy: 'This is a world of new dangers but also of new opportunities. The European Union has the potential to make a major contribution, both in dealing with the threats and in helping realise the opportunities. An active and capable European Union would make an impact on a global scale. In doing so, it would contribute to an effective multilateral system leading to a fairer, safer and more united world.' European Security Strategy, 2003: 15.

6 This is the so-called development logic thesis (Gazdag: 49).

study, neither is the European Defense Community (EDC)⁷ nor the Treaty of Brussels.⁸ Certain relations can be remarked between these early initiations and the prehistory of the civil crisis management, though. The plan of French Prime Minister⁹ René *Pleven*, called the Pleven Plan,¹⁰ tried to move on towards a common European army (multinational force) in the history of the European integration, but without success. From the view of the current essay, the relevant questions are: what would have been the purpose of setting up a European army and can any kind of relationship be perceived between the Pleven Plan and the later civil crisis management at all? The purpose of the Pleven Plan was, first of all, not a question of integration but rather the ambition to put the West German rearmament supported by the USA under European control (Gazdag: 135, Dedman 2010: 70–71). The Pleven Plan and the EDC proved to be a big step forward in the history of the integration indeed because it would have realized a foreign- and security political co-operation¹¹ as a response to the upcoming crisis in the actual global political environment. In those environments, this was the only choice for the development of the European crisis management.¹² On the other hand, the member states waived certain part of their sovereignty by signing the agreement regarding the EDC and established their own institutional structure of the foreign-policy integration. That was the point where the question of European defence and integration connected until the refusal of the French national assembly.¹³ It is important and interesting to underline that it was not the USA who tried to let fall the above plans, namely the common European security and defence policy.¹⁴

The history of the Western European Union (WEU) is strongly linked to the history of the European crisis management.¹⁵ The European (civil) crisis management had operated inside the WEU created by the Treaty of Brussels to be amended in 1954¹⁶ until the CFSP came into being.¹⁷ The role of the WEU was to ensure a European platform for the Atlantic Alliance incorporated in the NATO and it involved the

7 International treaty concluded on 27 May 1952 by and between Germany, France, Italy and the Benelux countries (Treaty of Paris).

8 That was the so-called five-party convention aiming at the European regional security, concluded on 17 March 1948.

9 It actually stemmed from Jean Monet.

10 It was adopted by the French National Assembly on 24 October 1950.

11 It was a unique idea in the economic integration so far (Dedman: 79).

12 See later (Article 3): the end of the bipolar world order.

13 On 30 August 1954, the French National Assembly refused to put the question of the EDC on the agenda at all (Gazdag: 153–154; Dedman: 77).

14 Moreover, in Dulles' opinion, the USA expected a Europe to be able to establish unity in the long run, which would preserve internal peace and prevent external aggression (Dedman: 77–78).

15 Besides that, the aim encoded in the European Defence Community, the control over the army industry of West Germany, was ensured by this institution for France (Gazdag: 178).

16 Concluded on 23 October 1954 in Paris.

17 The clear border-line was the creation of the ESDP (European Security and Defence Policy) in 1999.

former Second World War enemy, West Germany, into the common foreign policy discourse (Gazdag: 173). However, during a significant period of the functioning of the WEU and the Cold War, due to the relations of international politics – first of all, the bipolar world order –, the issue of the civil crisis management could not come up because there was not an international conflict or conflict inside a state worth for the two sides generating another world war (see for example the Cuban missile crisis or the Hungarian Revolution of 1956).

Following the end of the bipolar world order, both the end of the Cold War and the conflicts inside the states facilitated the creation of the European crisis management. The task sharing was basically simple: the European Communities were responsible for economic issues,¹⁸ while the WEU for the security ones. The demise of the WEU had been coded in advance since its tasks corresponded with the tasks of the NATO in practice; moreover, the WEU recognized the primacy of the NATO (Horváth-Sinka 2000: 93; Gazdag: 174, 258). Notwithstanding, as a puffer institution and talking shop, the WEU fit into the conceptions of the EU member states willing to preserve the primacy of the NATO till Saint Malo.

The WEU meeting of 19 June 1992 in Petersberg (Bonn) can be seen as a turning point. That was the first time for the WEU to speak out its intention to be ready to provide assistance for crisis management and crisis prevention, including the peacekeeping action of the UN and the OSCE.¹⁹

After the declaration of Maastricht,²⁰ the Petersberg declaration was a step forward on the road wished by the European leaders for the WEU as a defence component of the EU. The Petersberg tasks²¹ were deemed to be a decisive jump in the history of the civil crisis management, although these tasks – or at least their wording – had a military character.²² The activity of the WEU in the field of the European crisis management did not change a lot; even after the Petersberg tasks had been determined (Pagani 1998: 738), the WEU did not carry out civil crisis management actions in a substantial way (Bailes-Messervy-Whiting 2011: 69, 79). However, many civil crisis management missions were accomplished by the WEU between 1990 and 1999, for example in Albania or Bosnia-Herzegovina (Bailes-Messervy-Whiting: 28). Noteworthy is the crisis management action in Mostar (Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1994–1996) led jointly by the EU and WEU (Reichel 2010: 60–125).

After a while, the competence of the principal and political leader was taken over by the EU from the WEU (Bailes-Messervy-Whiting: 37), and then the EU obliged

18 The joint name of the European Coal and Steel Community, European Atomic Energy Community, European Economic Community between 1967 and 1993.

19 Western European Union Council of Ministers. Bonn, 19 June 1999. Petersberg Declaration. Article I. 2, 8.

20 WEU meeting, 10 December 1991.

21 Humanitarian and rescue missions, peacekeeping tasks, security forces tasks during the crisis management, including peacemaking.

22 Petersberg declaration. Article I.4.

itself contractually to carry out these tasks. After that, the WEU has completely lost its importance, and on 30 June 2011 it terminated its activity formally, too.

3. The Beginning of the EU's History of Civil Crisis Management

The collapse of communism affected decisively the European crisis management: by the disappearance of the bipolar world, the conflicts between the states (blocs) had been replaced by the conflicts inside the states. The dissolution of the Soviet empire and its alliance gave rise to the old conflicts suppressed so far, meaning mostly ethnic problems. The new-born states were not able to govern themselves in many cases (e.g.: Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia).

These new conflicts needed new-fashioned, complex crisis management, where the main figures of the crisis management so far (UN, OSCE, NATO) appeared not to be appropriate. In relation to the UN mission in Congo (1960–1964),²³ the circumstances had been changed profoundly and the EU was the one having the necessary tools in this new age. In the meantime, the EU had also become the world's biggest charity provider: in 2000, it provided more development assistance and charity than the USA and Japan together (Gazdag: 351).²⁴ The effective and actual form of the stand-alone European civil crisis management was brought to the scene by the butcheries on the Balkans in the 90s and by the fact that the available tools for the EU, even that time, seemed to be more suitable compared with the ones at the NATO's disposal to carry out stabilization and reconstruction tasks after the conflict (Chivvis 2010: 5). Although the military crisis management capacity was more emphasized at the beginning of ESDP in 1999, the civil crisis management also appeared at that time on this field of the foreign and security policy of the Union.

The inception of the history of the EU civil crisis management is tied to the European Commission (Halonen 2006: 16–17). One of the first civil crisis management missions of the EU in Mostar in the period of 1994–1996 was led by the Commission in Bosnia-Herzegovina, where the EU asserted the civil administration in the city.

The next step was the establishment of the CFSP (second pillar) by the Treaty of Maastricht of 1993²⁵ as it lifted up to contractual level that the member states want to co-operate to a certain extent in the field of foreign policy, too.²⁶ Initially, the implementer of the CFSP was the WEU. The aims of the CFSP (including especially

23 It is deemed to be a crisis management mission of first generation.

24 27,367 billion euros.

25 The Treaty of Maastricht was signed on 7 February 1992 and came into force on 1 November 1993.

26 See the Treaty of Maastricht, Title V.

the strengthening of the EU member states' security besides maintaining peace), more precisely, its protection, forecasted the necessity of shapening the civil crisis management of the EU (Gazdag: 254).²⁷ Ferenc *Gazdag* refers to the importance of the Treaty of Maastricht rightly from the point of view of this essay, suggesting that this topic (CFSP) could not be disregarded during the negotiations anymore; the decisions of the CFSP became legal obligations for the member states (Gazdag: 254).²⁸ The Treaty of Maastricht introduced the so-called joint action, serving as the operational frame of civil crisis management. The number of these actions reached 117 even in the period between the Treaty of Maastricht and Amsterdam (Gazdag: 243). The WEU was determined to be an organic part of the integration in the Treaty of Maastricht and got involved explicitly into the EU crisis management.²⁹

The inclusion of the Petersberg tasks into the Treaty of Amsterdam³⁰ proved to be a decisive step in the European crisis management, as thereby the (civil) crisis management got into the conceptions of the European integration in the narrow sense from the WEU or, in other words, from this time on, the EU accepted its role in this field openly and under the 'main institution'. Having the civil crisis management integrated into the Treaty of the European Union is deemed to be an innovation in world politics, taking into account that civil crisis management had not got such a distinguished role before at treaty level in any other international organization (Pagani 1998: 741). It is worth mentioning that the integration of the Petersberg tasks into the EU did not abolish in itself the crisis management role of the WEU (Pagani: 745). On the other hand, even before being integrated into the EU, the EU had the opportunity to get the WEU to implement its crisis management decisions (Pagani: 748).³¹ As already mentioned, after the Treaty of Amsterdam, the Petersberg tasks have become an integral part of the CFSP.³² Even this amending treaty failed to integrate the WEU into the EU, but the relation between the two organizations was definitely strengthened, indeed.³³ I would also like to refer to the introduction of the constructive abstention from a civil crisis management point of view, because it ensured some place for co-operation beside the unanimous decision-making before deciding on launching a civil crisis management mission.³⁴ Amsterdam had an impact on the financing of the

27 See the Treaty of Maastricht, Article J.1, 2, 4.

28 See the Treaty of Maastricht, Article J.1, 2, 4.

29 'The Union requests the Western European Union (WEU), which is an integral part of the development of the Union, to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications.' – Treaty of Maastricht, Article J.4.2.

30 Treaty of Amsterdam, Article 17.2. It was included into the treaty at Swedish and Finnish suggestion.

31 Treaty of Maastricht, Article J.4.2.

32 Treaty of Amsterdam, Article J.7.2.

33 Treaty of Amsterdam, Article J.7.3.

34 See the behaviour of Cyprus with regard to the adoption of the joint action initiating the EULEX Kosovo mission.

civil crisis management missions, too, by including the operational costs of the Petersberg tasks beside administrative costs at the expense of the EU budget.³⁵

The Nice summit of 2000 put the enhanced co-operation into the CFSP, having consequences also on the civil crisis management, since the enhanced co-operation could be expanded also on launching and managing a civil crisis management action.³⁶

4. The Evolution of the EU's Civil Crisis Management on the Edge of the New Millenium

The independent European civil crisis management was initiated and determined by the EU summits in Cologne, Helsinki, Feira and Göteborg.³⁷ First of all, in Cologne (3–4 June 1999), the European leaders – touched by the horrible events in Kosovo – decided to set up an independent European crisis management capacity.³⁸ Another decision made in Cologne was to mandate the EU with the exclusive implementation of the Petersberg tasks,³⁹ by ending the WEU's activity.⁴⁰ The General Affairs Council was mandated here to create the necessary conditions and take the required measures in order to reach the aims. This work was left for the Finnish presidency ('as a matter of priority').⁴¹ Both the Cologne summit and the wording of its conclusions were influenced by the war in Kosovo. Therefore, the necessity of the European military crisis management capability was predominantly emphasized here.⁴²

35 Treaty of Amsterdam, Article J.18.3.

36 EU Treaty amended by the Treaty of Nice, Article 27 b.

37 Actually, the process began in 1998 in Saint Malo, which was important for military crisis management.

38 'We are convinced that to fully assume its tasks in the field of conflict prevention and crisis management the European Union must have at its disposal the appropriate capabilities and instruments.' Cologne European Council 3–4 June 1999. Conclusions of the Presidency. Annex III – European Council Declaration on Strengthening the Common European Policy on Security and Defence. Article 2.

39 '...we are convinced that the Council should have the ability to take decisions on the full range of conflict prevention and crisis management tasks defined in the Treaty on European Union, the "Petersberg tasks". To this end, the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action...' Cologne European Council 3–4 June 1999. Conclusions of the Presidency. Annex III.1.

40 Gazdag, 286. p. Cologne European Council 3–4 June 1999. Conclusions of the Presidency. Annex III.5.

41 Cologne European Council 3–4 June 1999. Conclusions of the Presidency. Article 56.

42 It also mentioned that the strengthening of non-military tools and their better co-ordination are necessary. See Article 56 of the declaration.

At the Helsinki summit (10–11 December 1999), the final conclusions recognized the primacy of the UN in the field of maintaining the international peace and security.⁴³ The decision to establish the mechanism of civil crisis management was made in Helsinki in order to develop the tools of the civil crisis management more efficient and co-ordinative.⁴⁴ The so-called *Action Plan for Non-Military Crisis Management of the EU* was adopted here.⁴⁵ A deeper examination of this document would exceed the frames of this essay; however, it has to be mentioned that it aimed at strengthening and supporting the launch of the EU's independent civil crisis management actions.⁴⁶ The Helsinki declaration initiated the procedure⁴⁷ leading to the determination of four strategic areas of the civil crisis management at the Feira summit (19–20 June 2000): police, rule of law, public administration and civil protection.⁴⁸ It was later expanded by monitoring missions, the assistance for the so-called special representatives⁴⁹ and SSR (security sector reform),⁵⁰ as well as assistance in the field of DDR⁵¹ (disarmament, demobilization, reintegration).⁵² Another decision made at the Helsinki summit was the establishment of a new institution: the CIVCOM (Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management)⁵³ constituted in May 2000 has become a relevant factor in the development of the European civil crisis management since the strategies to be followed in different areas of crisis management are determined by this body. It also monitors the activity of all the ongoing EU civil crisis management missions.

43 Presidency Conclusions. Helsinki European Council. 10 and 11 December 1999. See Article 26 of the declaration.

44 See Article 28 of the declaration.

45 Presidency Conclusions. Helsinki European Council. 10 and 11 December 1999. Annex 2 to Annex IV. Presidency Report on Non-Military Crisis Management of the European Union.

46 Furthermore, it aimed at the coherence inside the pillar system, the EU's consent to actions initiated by other organizations and at the coherence between national, collective and NGO resources and strengthening responsibility.

47 See Article 29 of the declaration. At the Helsinki Summit, a decision was made to draw up a report about target numbers (Headline Goal) the EU member states want to achieve in the field of crisis management. The European leaders decided here on the creation of the rapid reaction capacity, the determining of the frame and methods thereof, the staff required for it and the necessity of determination of the material and financial resources (action plan). In this regard, an inventory, a database and a survey are prescribed by the annex of the declaration (ANNEX 2 to ANNEX IV).

48 Santa Maria Da Feira European Council 19 and 20 June 2000. Conclusions of the Presidency. Annex I – Presidency Report on Strengthening the Common European Security and Defence Policy. Appendix III.B.

49 Special representative of the EU in specific areas.

50 Many names are used in the literature: Security Governance Reform, Security Sector Reform or Security System Reform. The first mission of that kind was the European Union Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

51 The first mission of that kind was the Aceh mission in Indonesia.

52 The areas of civil crisis management are still expanding: civil crisis management action can focus on defending human rights, border control and certain monitoring activities, too.

53 This body is integrated into the General Secretariat of the Council and consists of delegates from the member states and also from the Commission and the Council.

At the Feira summit, the EU expressed its support for third states to be involved in the European crisis management.⁵⁴ Here, the civil crisis management meant to be the primacy of police assistance.⁵⁵

At the Nice summit (7–10 December 2000), there did not happen any crucial change with regard to the civil crisis management, except for making clear that the EU is mandated on the police field both with strengthening and replacing domestic police forces (Halonen: 21).⁵⁶

At the Göteborg summit (15–16 June 2001), the integral approach of the crisis management, the civil protection and the involvement of non-member states in the European crisis management were stressed.⁵⁷ In June 2001, here was the so-called Police Plan adopted.⁵⁸ Also, the attention was drawn to the necessity of the complex training for people being employed in terms of civil crisis management (Halonen: 22).⁵⁹ Furthermore, new aims were set in the field of the rule of law, civil protection and public administration.⁶⁰ Göteborg was the place where member states spoke out their will of concentrating civil crisis management in the field of the rule of law, after having recognized it as a precondition of peace and security.⁶¹

At the end of the process, at the Laeken summit (14–15 December 2001), the EU could firmly announce its ability to launch crisis management actions independently (Nowak 2006: 24). In this respect, the Laeken declaration has to be highlighted again because it evaluated the EU and the integration process clearly more than a pure economic entity.⁶² The Laeken declaration announced the

54 Santa Maria Da Feira European Council 19 and 20 June 2000 Conclusions of the Presidency. Artilec C.10.

55 'Recognising the central role of police in international crisis management operations...' Santa Maria Da Feira European Council 19 and 20 June 2000 Conclusions of the Presidency. Appendix IV.A.1.

56 Presidency Conclusions. Nice European Council Meeting. 7, 8 and 9 December 2000. Annex II to Annex VI. II.2.

57 Presidency Report to the Göteborg European Council on European Security and Defence Policy. Annex III: New Concrete Targets for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management. Article 16, 43–44.

58 Presidency Report to the Göteborg European Council on European Security and Defence Policy. Annex I to the Annex.

59 Presidency Report to the Göteborg European Council on European Security and Defence Policy. Annex III. 18.

60 Presidency Report to the Göteborg European Council on European Security and Defence Policy. Annex III: New Concrete Targets for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management. Article 17.

61 Presidency Report to the Göteborg European Council on European Security and Defence Policy. Annex III: New Concrete Targets for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management. Article 2.

62 'The European Union has thus gradually come into being. In the beginning, it was more of an economic and technical collaboration. Twenty years ago, with the first direct elections to the European Parliament, the Community's democratic legitimacy, which until then had lain with the Council alone, was considerably strengthened. Over the last ten years, the construction of a political union has begun and cooperation been established on social policy, employment, asylum, immigration, police, justice, foreign policy and a common security and defence policy.' Presidency Conclusions
European Council Meeting in Laeken 14 and 15 December 2001. Annex I.I.

EU to take part as a crisis management actor in the new world order.⁶³ Another important perception to be mentioned in the Laeken declaration was the need for the joint development and for the co-ordination of the capacity of military and civil crisis management.⁶⁴

5. Civil Crisis Management Actions

The first chapter of the European civil and military crisis management is linked to the Balkans.⁶⁵ No doubt, it was influenced by the fact that in the 90s the EU was not able to perform an effective crisis management and consequently to prevent the bloody events in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo.⁶⁶ By launching the European Union Police Mission (EUPM)⁶⁷ in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the first civil crisis management mission on the EU's part in 2003, the EU browsed to a completely new part in its European civil crisis management book. This mission was followed shortly by many others. Another five missions have been initiated on the Balkans by the EU; with two exceptions, all of them were civil crisis management actions. EUPM was also the EU's first police mission,⁶⁸ while the first rule of law mission was the EUJUST THEMIS⁶⁹ and the first monitoring mission the EUJUST LEX.⁷⁰ In the development process the EU has reached by now the level of being able to launch and manage several civil and military – and also hybrid⁷¹ – crisis management actions simultaneously, even in different continents. Speaking about the reality, in June 2013, this meant twelve ongoing military and civil crisis management missions altogether.⁷²

The EU came out of the Balkans to the edge of Europe, to the Caucasus relatively quickly. As the first rule of law mission, the EUJUST THEMIS lasted from July

63 'The role it has to play is that of a power, resolutely doing battle against all violence, all terror and all fanaticism, but which also does not turn a blind eye to the world's heartrending injustices.' Presidency Conclusions European Council Meeting in Laeken 14 and 15 December 2001. Annex 1. Laeken Declaration on the Future of the European Union.

64 Presidency Conclusions European Council Meeting in Laeken 14 and 15 December 2001. Annex 2. Declaration on the Operational Capability of the Common European Security and Defence Policy.

65 See, for example, Operation Althea, Operation Concordia, Operation Proxima missions.

66 The lack of crisis management capability was in Jacques Delors's words: humiliation (Dedman: 183).

67 Its start was decided at the Sevilla summit in June 2002. This mission is also worth mentioning because here the EU took over the task of the UN (United Nations' International Police Task Force).

68 2,300 people worked in the mission during the years, which cost 32,940,897 euros.

69 EU Rule of Law Mission to Georgia.

70 European Union Integrated Rule of Law Mission for Iraq.

71 See, for example, the European Union civilian military supporting action to the African Union Mission in the Darfur region of Sudan (AMIS).

72 <http://www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/> (Last access: 27.08.2013.)

2004 to July 2005, also becoming a relevant part of the European civil crisis management history. The potential of the European civil crisis management was proved by the fact that the EU appeared on other continents in the framework of the ESDP, beyond localizing the dangers directly threatening the European borders. The first mission to Africa was the EUPOL Kinshasa⁷³ in April 2005, while in Asia the Aceh mission meant the beginning in September 2005.⁷⁴ The most serious undertaking by the EU in Asia in the field of civil crisis management is considered to be the still ongoing EUPOL Afghanistan initiated in mid-2007.⁷⁵

Another point worth highlighting is the first civil-military (hybrid) mission in the European crisis management history, the AMIS, initiated by the EU in Sudan in 2005.⁷⁶

The appearance of the EU in the Middle East is again considered a significant event in Palestine (EU BAM RAFAH, EUPOL COPS)⁷⁷ in November 2005, at least in a symbolic sense; however, the efficiency thereof is highly disputed.⁷⁸ In my opinion, Palestine is the right place where one of the political preconditions – i.e. the trust of the people living in the affected area – of the successful civil crisis management towards the EU is given, in contrast with other international organizations and states.

Without a doubt, launching the rule of law mission in Kosovo (European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo, EULEX Kosovo) in February 2008 was a crucial juncture,⁷⁹ which indicated a new level in the European civil crisis management due to its staff number and to the complexity of tasks. Concerning the way how to handle its relations with Russia, the EU's presence in Georgia from October 2008 can be seen as an important milestone after the conflict between Russia and Georgia.⁸⁰

The strength of the EU civil crisis management is confirmed by its being able to maintain four military crisis management actions and twelve civil crisis management missions at the same time. Moreover, only one of them can be found in Europe in a narrower sense (EULEX Kosovo), while six of them proceed in

73 EU police mission in Kinshasa, from April 2005 till June 2007 in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

74 Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) from September 2005 till December 2006.

75 EU Police mission in Afghanistan. It was launched by the EU in June 2007 and is still ongoing. About 550 people work in the mission with the participation of 24 EU member states and Canada.

76 European Union civilian-military supporting action to the African Union mission in the Darfur region of Sudan. From July 2005 till December 2007.

77 EU Police Mission in the Palestinian Territories (EUPOL COPS): started its activity in 2005 and is still ongoing. EU Border Assistance Mission at Rafah Crossing Point (EU BAM RAFAH): started its activity in November 2005 and is still ongoing.

78 Ladzik 2009: 5.

79 The mission started practically in December 2008.

80 European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM) in Georgia, started in October 2008 and is still ongoing

Africa and two in the Middle East.⁸¹ Further elaborations would exceed the limits of this essay; however, we should mention that Europe is aware of Africa's future possible impacts and dangers to Europe. It feels also the responsibility for solving the conflict in the Middle East, while in Asia the EU's tasks are based on the transatlantic alliance. Last but not least, by considering the extension of the civil crisis management area, the conclusion can be drawn that the EU defines its defence zone increasingly broader and, on the other hand, it assumes its value-mediating role even more often (Németh 2013: 342–360).

6. Documents Related to the Civil Crisis Management after 2003

In the European civil crisis management history, the *European Security Strategy* from 2003 has to be assigned a distinctive role. The core relevance of this document was that it defined the EU's future foreign policy programme in a comprehensive way. One of the basic perceptions of the document is 'preventive engagement,' which means showing commitments to prevent threats. Two of the five biggest dangers to the EU are connected to civil crisis management according to this document: organized crime and problems concerning failed states. The Security Strategy clearly refers to the fact that the solution for the challenges can not be a purely military one.⁸² The EU has to be even more active in crisis management – claims this document.

According to the literature (Halonen 2006: 24), the next period of the European civil crisis management began in 2004 with adopting the *Action Plan for Civilian Aspects of ESDP*.⁸³ It was created after the adoption of the European Security Strategy and the accession of the Eastern European countries to the EU. The document refers to the experiences with regard to the European civil crisis management resulted by the EU expansion in May 2004. According to the action plan, the complexity of the crisis situations requires multifunctional crisis management on the EU side.⁸⁴ The action plan emphasized the importance of the monitoring missions as well as the united training and co-operation between military and civil crisis management.

As a summary, I would like to highlight in relation to both above-mentioned documents that these considered the crisis management as a complex task requiring both military and civil crisis management activities on the EU's part.

81 And one in the Caucasus, in Georgia.

82 'In contrast to the massive visible threat in the Cold War, none of the new threats is purely military; nor can any be tackled by purely military means. Each requires a mixture of instruments.' European Security Strategy, 8.

83 Adopted by the European Council on 17-18 June 2004.

84 Action Plan for Civilian Aspects of ESDP. 3.

The enlargement of 2004 was a new chapter in European crisis management, taking into account that, as of 1 May 2004, the Balkans, Ukraine and the Caucasus⁸⁵ became the direct neighbourhood of the EU. On the other hand, the new member states were more capable of carrying out civil crisis management than military contributions.

In December 2004, the Council adopted the *Civilian Headline Goal (CHG) 2008*, whose implementation had been started in 2005. It was later amended in 2007, resulting in the *CHG 2010*. The CHG 2008 was the first attempt at defining which capacities are needed by the EU to achieve the aims determined in the European Security Strategy (Rintakoski 2006: 214).

The – finally failed – Constitutional Treaty⁸⁶ would have brought significant changes first of all in the field of military crisis management.⁸⁷ However, the Constitutional Treaty would have extended notably the contractual definition of the Petersberg tasks because it would have expanded the opportunity of crisis management to common disarming actions, military advising and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and post-conflict tasks in order to stabilize the situation.⁸⁸ The so-called special amending clause⁸⁹ would have been also important in the EU decision-making concerning the civil crisis management since it would have changed the exclusive principle of the unanimity towards the possibility of deciding by qualified majority within the frame of the intergovernmental co-operation. The Constitutional Treaty would have extended the cases of the decision to be made by qualified majority by involving the European decision accepted at the proposal of the High Representative⁹⁰ if the European Council had requested him for submitting it.⁹¹

The Treaty of Lisbon⁹² was an important milestone for the European civil crisis management, too. I am not going into the details of this amending treaty; however, some points thereof are considered to be crucial in this regard. It enlarged the Petersberg tasks with disarming actions, military assistance and advising, post-conflict stabilization tasks and the fight against terrorism.⁹³ The Treaty of Lisbon does not make it possible for the member states attending the permanent structured co-operation⁹⁴ to initiate a crisis management action on their own,

85 The latter one only across the sea.

86 Treaty establishing a constitution for Europe. Signed by the leaders of the Member States on 29 October 2004.

87 See the European Defence Agency, institutions of permanent structured co-operation and the collective defence and solidarity clause.

88 Constitutional Treaty, Article III-309. (1).

89 Constitutional Treaty, Article III-300. (3).

90 High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.

91 Constitutional Treaty, Article III-300. (2) b).

92 Signed on 13 December 2007 by the Member States.

93 Treaty of Lisbon, Article 28b.

94 It is linked first of all to the military crisis management; see the Treaty on the European Union,

thereby overruling the principle of unanimity in the decision-making (Quillle 2008: 6–7),⁹⁵ preventing the split of the unified European crisis management. The opportunity of qualified majority cases has been extended by the above explained case concerning the Constitutional Treaty by the Lisbon Treaty⁹⁶ and the special amending clause has been integrated into the Treaty on the European Union. The Treaty of Lisbon established two new institutions involved into the civil crisis management, the European External Service and the European Defence Agency.⁹⁷ Last but not least, the Lisbon Treaty⁹⁸ tried to solve the immediate financing problems of the civil crisis management mission.⁹⁹

7. The Presence and Future of the European Civil Crisis Management

Speaking briefly about the European civil crisis management today, I would like to summarize it with the following statement: the geographical area to be affected by the missions is extending, the staff number involved in the missions is growing and the tasks of the missions are becoming more and more complex. These tendencies prove in itself that the European civil crisis management has become much stronger during the last 10 years. According to Gazdag, the development of the EU's foreign policy can be perceived in the most expressive way in the field of crisis management (Gazdag: 339).

In my opinion, the EU has found its task and identity in the field of the civil crisis management much rather than in military crisis management; the number of the ongoing civil crisis missions proves it: in 2013, this number was 12:4 in favour of civil crisis management actions compared with military crisis management missions.

Important conclusions can be reached by scrutinizing some facts. Looking at the contribution of the Member States to the staff of the civil crisis management missions, we can see Italy, Germany and France in leading position, while from Eastern Europe, Romania has to be mentioned. In spite of its population

Article 42 (6).

95 See the Treaty on the European Union, Article 28a (4).

96 Decision made on the proposal of the High Representative of the CSDP. Treaty of Lisbon, Article 34.b), i) and iv).

97 Treaty on the European Union, articles 27 (3) and 45 (1).

98 See the Treaty of Lisbon, Article 47.d) regulating the immediate access to the EU's resources in order to launch civil crisis management undisturbed in case of a respective decision of the Council of the European Union. The Treaty also regulates the creation of a starting fund to finance mission-preparing activities not to be borne by the EU's budget.

99 However, civil crisis management missions had been financed even before that from the CFSP budget, contrary to the military missions (principle of 'costs lie where they fall' and the Athena mechanism).

and the international weight of the country, Great Britain and Spain neglect the 'European idea' inside this area of the CSDP (Common Security and Defence Policy),¹⁰⁰ while Sweden, Finland, Denmark and Hungary provide vital forces for the European civil crisis management.¹⁰¹

To form a clear idea of how much the European civil crisis management has developed, please, take a look at the numbers of the first and last (at least so far) civil crisis management action on the Balkans. The EUPM financed its activity in 2012 with a budget in the amount of 5.25 million euros, while the EULEX Kosovo budget amounts to 111 million euros annually. The staff number in EUPM was 774, in the EULEX Kosovo 2,250.¹⁰² The numbers show a European civil crisis management needing more and more people. Beyond the contributions from the member states, the number of the staff coming from third states and that of the international and national employees are increasing.¹⁰³ The number of the civil crisis management missions, the task to be carried out and the staff increase have a clear impact on the CFSP (CSDP) budget: it is nine times higher than it was at the beginning (Greco, Pirozzi, Silvestri 2010: 106; Grevi-Helly-Keohane 2009: 405).¹⁰⁴

If I had to forecast the future connection between the 'Europe idea' and the civil crisis management, I would mention the followings. The crisis of the Eurozone likely 'improves' or may promote¹⁰⁵ other areas of the European integration such as the civil crisis management. In the course of the extension of the civil crisis management, the democratic principle should be respected and strengthened, which means a civil crisis management functioning controlled by the people on a daily basis (democratic accountability, Greco-Pirozzi-Silvestri: 105, 109–110). To be successful in spreading the 'Europe idea,' a joint approach has to be agreed in foreign policy between the Member States, at least in strategic issues (Greco-Pirozzi-Silvestri: 106; Grevi-Helly-Keohane: 405). The EU should be aware of handling it in an international environment established before the EU would step on this stage. Therefore, a smooth co-operation with the other international organizations is highly recommended and welcome in the field of civil crisis management, too.¹⁰⁶

All things considered, in my opinion, the connection between the 'Europe idea' and civil crisis management is that the latter turned out to be a source of

100 The renamed ESDP after Lisbon.

101 The above-mentioned conclusions are based on pieces of information of April 2009 (Grevi-Helly-Keohane: Annex 2).

102 <http://www.eulex-kosovo.eu/en/info/whatisEulex.php> (Last access: 27.08.2013).

103 Civilian CSDP Missions: lessons and best practices (Report 2009). May 2010: 3.

104 From 47.5 million euros to 406 million euros. Civilian CSDP Missions: 4.

105 Because the EU tries to reach success in other fields, thereby reassuring its citizens' belief in European integration.

106 The co-operation with NGOs is also necessary because of the experiences these institutions have in the field of crisis management. They can also help in forecasting a crisis (Rintakoski: 208–209).

European identity (a tool to strengthen this identity), just like the freedom of movement inside the Schengen area, the European citizenship and the euro.¹⁰⁷

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¹⁰⁷ Positive signal that the public support for European foreign policy (60%) and crisis management (74%) inside Europe is high (Algieri: 435).

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