



Diplomatic Steps of the Antall Government towards the Euro-Atlantic Integration¹

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Abstract. My dissertation is based on more than ten years of archival research. One of the goals of Antall's foreign policy was the Euro-Atlantic integration. In December 1991, Hungary signed an association agreement with the European Community. By 1992, opinions on the future were divided between and within the Member States of the European Communities. There was a debate among the twelve about the concept of 'deepening' or 'widening', and the term 'multi-speed Europe' appeared. At this time, a number of questions arose about the full membership of the Trio in NATO, of which 'how' and 'when' came first. It has also been suggested whether it would be more appropriate to intensify economic and political cooperation rather than military ones. Perhaps the NACC should be thoroughly expanded first and then move on to expanding the range of full member states?

Keywords: Antall's foreign policy, integration, European agreement, NACC, NATO

My dissertation is based on more than ten years of archival research, which I have published in two volumes so far;² the third volume is about to be published, and the fourth volume is under preparation. The top-secret documents of the period, created in the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, can now be searched in the National Archives of the Hungarian National Archives.³

As a result of the first free and democratic elections in Hungary, József Antall formed a government in May 1990. One of the goals of Antall's foreign policy was the Euro-Atlantic integration. At the end of October 1991, at the North Atlantic Council in Brussels, József Antall put it this way: 'The European integration is

1 This paper was presented at the conference *Past, Present and Future of Central Europe*, organized by Budapest Business School and Sapientia Hungarian University of Transylvania in Cluj-Napoca on 20 November 2020 (online conference).

2 Sáringer 2015, 2018.

3 See also Kecskés 2018; Gazdag 1997; Jeszenszky 2002, 2016; Marinovich 2019, Valki 1997, and Wörner 2001.

inconceivable without a transatlantic cooperation. [...] For us, NATO is the key to the stability of Europe. [...] The region in Central Europe that our three countries represent is also extremely important to NATO from a security perspective.’⁴ From the point of view of Hungarian diplomacy, many called the year 1990 ‘the year of miracles’, which, if we take it into account, can characterize 1991 as a period of ‘hope’ and ‘desires’. And 1992 was more of a year of ‘reality’.

János Martonyi put it this way:

I will talk briefly about two things in a European context, one is geopolitics and the other is the economy. Let’s call the first one ‘flag’ for the sake of simplicity, because it’s a flag, and the second one is called ‘trade’. There is an old debate over which one is more important. For a trader, trade is usually more important; he wants to trade. For politics, it is important that the state, political units, and political entities be able to take their flag, influence, and power to as many places as possible. There is also an old debate about who was the first. Whether the merchant landed with fiery water and other products offered for sale to the natives, or whether the warship appeared first. The two are closely linked.⁵

In 1991, the European Community introduced the term Europe Agreements, reflecting the particular importance of the expected associations. Negotiations have started with three states: Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. József Antall participated in the meeting of the European Communities held in Brussels on 16–17 December 1991, where the Association Agreement, the so-called Europe Agreement, between the Republic of Hungary and the European Community was signed, confirmed by the Hungarian Parliament resolution of 17 November 1992. The trade policy chapter of the Agreement came into force on 1 March 1992, while the other parts (from the completion of the partial ratifications – in the case of Hungary) came into force in February 1994. The Association Agreement decided to establish a free trade area and to implement the ‘four freedoms’ (liberalization of goods, services, labour, and capital flows). The European Council in Copenhagen in June 1993 decided on the possibility of enlarging the European Union towards the east, setting out the basic political, economic, and legal criteria that the countries of Central and Eastern Europe wishing to join had to meet. Following the entry into force of the Europe Agreement governing association on 1 February 1994 – based on the authorization contained in Resolution No. 16/1995 (III.31.) HP adopted by consensus of the parliamentary parties –, the Government submitted Hungary’s application to join the European Union on 31 March 1994. The Contracting Parties have established an institutional framework for political cooperation and have targeted full industrial free trade after two to five years of asymmetric tariff

4 Antall 2015: 593–594, vol. II.

5 Martonyi 2018: 137. Quotation translated by the author of this paper.

dismantling. During the negotiations, Hungary and the countries of the region clearly sought to achieve full membership. From December 1991, customs duties on industrial products were abolished in trade between them. The Association Agreement promoted economic, financial, and cultural cooperation and helped to develop Hungary's economy and market economy. The Association's institutional system included the Association Council, which consisted of members of the Council of Ministers and the European Commission on behalf of the EU, as well as members and officials of the Hungarian government.

Almost at the same time as the signing of the Association Agreement, the Maastricht European Council took place in December 1991, where instead of recruiting new members, they committed themselves in favour of strengthening internal integration as closely and deeply as possible. At that time, the leaders of the European Communities gave priority to vertical integration rather than horizontal enlargement.

The Twelve signed the *Treaty on European Union* on 7 February 1992, which set out, inter alia, the objective of political cohesion. It is common ground that the Treaty entered into force on 1 November 1993 and has three pillars: the European Community, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and cooperation in the field of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA). The first pillar is the European Economic Community, the European Coal and Steel Community, and Euratom, to which the Economic and Monetary Union and the customs union are closely linked.

Fearing the existing economic and political position of the EC member states, they were much more interested in the implementation of free market principles than in the full integration of the Central and Eastern European states. At the same time, the road to full membership remained open, and countries wishing to join were encouraged to implement the Maastricht conditions. But in Maastricht, the economic and financial conditions for full membership – the so-called convergence criteria – were defined, which neither the Visegrád countries nor the Eastern European states could meet at that time.

One of the most important areas of NATO's transformation has been the Alliance's partnership. At the end of December 1991, the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) was established, with the aim of NATO cooperating with the former member states of the Warsaw Pact and the new states that emerged after the break-up of the Soviet Union. To the surprise of Hungary and the two Visegrád countries, eleven former Soviet republics of the newly formed Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), including Russia, were invited to become founding members of the NACC. Georgia and Azerbaijan, along with Albania, joined the NACC in 1992, and the Central Asian republics soon followed their example.⁶ NATO decision makers did

⁶ The North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) was established on 20 December 1991. Launched in 1994, the Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme has integrated several partners and covered a wide range of defence cooperation, including defence reform.

not see the North Atlantic Cooperation Council as a first step towards accession but merely as a forum for contact, cooperation, and dialogue between the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and NATO.

Three months after the coup against Mikhail Gorbachev in August 1991, the invitation of eleven members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) to the NACC was in line with the logic of NATO's positive security guarantees. Taking into account the legitimate Soviet security interests, they helped the democratic forces led by Boris Yeltsin in parallel with the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the withdrawal of Soviet troops in Europe. NATO decision makers wanted to replace the threat with security guarantees by creating a forum for cooperation and dialogue, the NACC, to reduce the sense of threat in the CIS member states and thus the weight of conservative forces both inside and outside Russia. In the most conservative part of the former Soviet military leadership, with the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the withdrawal of Soviet troops, the 'we are alone against Europe' argument remained strong, along with imperial attitudes. Adding that the subsistence situation of officers and civilians withdrawn from Eastern Europe was extremely difficult, they faced severe supply and housing problems.

The Visegrád countries assessed their situation as special, as the EC had already recognized the relative separation of the Visegrád countries by signing the Association Agreement and thus hoped to join NATO relatively faster than the Eastern European states. However, the events in the Baltics and Moscow in early and mid-1991 significantly slowed down the process, precisely by applying positive and negative security guarantees from NATO decision makers to the CIS member states. However, for security policy reasons, Budapest, Warsaw, and Prague wanted to speed up their NATO membership precisely because of the above-mentioned Soviet reorganization attempts.

According to Warsaw, the fastest and most effective way to get into the EC is to prepare and join the Visegrád Group together. Polish politicians have estimated that full membership will be a process of at least ten years, the first phase of which will be the strengthening of the V3s. In Warsaw, the view that the road to NATO was through the WEU became commonplace, and the main task of Polish diplomacy in the medium term was to formalize relations with the WEU – associate membership or observer status.⁷ The attention of Czech and Slovak politicians at that time was mainly focused on the future of their own country, the issues related to the emergence of the independent Czech Republic and Slovakia on the international stage. They agreed that Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary should strengthen their stability in the region.⁸

7 Summary by Mihály Domszky, Temporary Chargé d'Affaires of the Embassy in Warsaw, on the Polish assessment of the security, economic and political situation in Central Europe. ANAH XIX-J-1-j 1992. 72. b. 25 September 1992.

8 Summary by Ambassador György Varga from the Embassy in Prague about the assessment of the security situation in the Central European region in Prague. ANAH XIX-J-1-j 1992. 72. b. 22 September 1992.

At this time, a number of questions arose about the full membership of the Trio in NATO, of which 'how' and 'when' came first. It has also been suggested whether it would be more appropriate to intensify economic and political cooperation rather than military ones. Perhaps the NACC should be thoroughly expanded first and then move on to expanding the range of full member states?

The neutral Switzerland, Sweden, and Austria maintained close ties with NATO countries during the Cold War. By including the Three, NATO would have ignored these states, in which it would have provoked resentment. Russia and Eastern European countries may have argued that they also need a security guarantee. Turkey would have resented that NATO's attention would turn to Central Europe instead, when there were also different levels of development within NATO. At that time, enlargement could have led to friction and perhaps even instability both inside and outside NATO. It was also a problem that new full entrants could have immediately requested modern weapons or made other demands that NATO countries could not or did not want to meet.⁹

At that time, the Netherlands, Portugal, and the United Kingdom formed the EC Troika. The views of London and Amsterdam on enlargement, NATO, and the Conference on European and Security Cooperation (CSCE) are also relevant in this regard. In addition to the many questions and question marks mentioned above about the enlargement of the EC and NATO, the terms 'dilemma', 'debate', and, at other times, 'inopportune' are better read in the available documents.

British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd stressed before the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee that conflicts do not arise between the states of the region and an external power but between the peoples freed from oppression. In his view, therefore, there is no need to intervene in a security integration designed to counter an external threat. The main direction of building the safety net is to further develop the CSCE process. The NACC does not provide a guarantee of security and cannot be a forum for conflict resolution. A question of the representatives of Hungary and Czechoslovakia regarding the possible membership of NATO was resolved by the Minister by stating that no such request had been received from the mentioned countries, so the issue was not on the agenda.¹⁰

Boudewijn Johannes van Eenennaam, Head of the Atlantic Cooperation Directorate for Atlantic Cooperation and Security Policy at the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, told Ambassador István Csejtei in The Hague that we needed to answer the question of what to do in the current situation. At the moment, the answer to this is that we need to address the security needs of the Three primarily within the NACC. Only if this is not possible at all is the issue of full membership possible on the agenda, but we

9 Ambassador in The Hague István Csejtei's note on the question marks of the NATO membership of the Visegrád Three. ANAH XIX-J-1-j 1992. 82. b. 26 February 1992.

10 Cryptography from London. British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd's assessment of democracies in Central and Eastern Europe. ANAH XIX-J-1-j 6. b. 15 January 1992.

will have to think carefully about it. The best explanation would be if we could prove that only full membership is the solution, and no other constellation is possible.¹¹ In addition, there was a debate in the Netherlands as to whether the 'Visegrád Three' should be treated differently from a security policy point of view or whether it would be more appropriate to treat the whole region, including the European CIS republics, relatively uniformly. In the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the 'Atlanticist', which put NATO at the forefront, and in the Ministry of Defence, the 'European', which was sympathetic to the Western European Union, was stronger.¹²

The Advisory Committee on Security Policy of the Dutch Minister for Foreign Affairs and Defence, called the Peace and Security Advisory Committee, prepared a report on the security situation in Central European countries by the end of November 1991, which was discussed by members of the Dutch Parliament on 28 November 1991. The starting point for the Advisory Committee's analysis was that the Visegrád countries have an advantage over other Central and Eastern European countries in establishing democratic conditions, but their security situation is unstable, and democracy itself could be jeopardized if NATO does not receive clear security guarantees. The Commission's proposal is that the Visegrád Three should be given some special connection in the context of NATO.

According to Dutch Foreign Minister Hans Van den Broek, the Commission's proposal is sympathetic, but it would be too early to put it into practice. He added that care should also be taken to ensure that the accession of new countries does not loosen NATO's internal cohesion, so the NACC must be activated before any country is offered special status. However, this did not preclude further relations with Central European countries at a later stage. The Dutch Foreign Minister further objected that it was not expedient to differentiate the Visegrád Three at the beginning of the relationship building. According to him, the Three of them are less afraid of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991, and therefore the establishment of security guarantees is no longer so urgent. If a special relationship is established with the Three, the whole nature of NATO will change. Van den Broek's caution also reflected the debate and dilemma as to whether NATO, the EC, or the CSCE would be the basis of the new European security system.¹³

NATO's enlargement was primarily opposed by France, which may have been due to the fact that while the Visegrád countries also joined NATO's military organization, France, Spain, and Greece would still be formally members of the political organization. The other reason is that France was interested in strengthening

11 Ambassador in The Hague István Csejtei's note on the question marks of the NATO membership of the Visegrád Three. ANAH XIX-J-1-j 1992. 82. b. 26 February 1992.

12 Cryptography from The Hague. Security policy aspirations of the Netherlands. ANAH XIX-J-1-j 1992. 72. b. 30 March 1992.

13 Ambassador in The Hague István Csejtei's note on the proposals of the Advisory Board of the Dutch Foreign Minister and Minister of War regarding the Visegrád Three. ANAH XIX-J-1-j 1992. 82. b. 7 January 1992.

the Western European Union, not NATO.¹⁴ In addition, Amsterdam called for closer cooperation between the Visegrád Cooperation and the Benelux Union.

At the *Fourth Follow-up Meeting of the Conference on Security and Co-Operation in Europe*,¹⁵ the Sixteen NATO Member States and Hungary, Belarus, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Georgia, Poland, Russia, Romania, and Ukraine signed the *Open Skies Treaty* on 24 March 1992 in Helsinki.¹⁶ The treaty allowed the participating countries to carry out observation flights over the territory of any other country in the 'Vancouver to Vladivostok' area.

It logically followed from Budapest's commitment to the Euro-Atlantic integration that it has made it possible to patrol AWACS (airborne warning and control system) aircraft in Hungarian airspace, and it was also important for Budapest to control AWACS aircraft over Hungary. During the South Slavic crisis, Serbian Air Force aircraft made several flights into Hungarian territory. The Hungarian government has repeatedly protested against the violation of Hungary's airspace, so on 17 September 1991 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs condemned a series of airspace violations of aircraft arriving from the South Slavic territory. During the South Slavic war, several bullets hit Hungarian territory several times due to acts of war. The most serious incident occurred on 27 October 1991, when the Serbian-controlled Yugoslav army dropped two cluster bombs on the town of Barcs at 8:15 p.m. The bombs exploded in a remote part of the city, with no personal injury but damage to several buildings. In the negotiations in Subotica over the incident, the Yugoslav side denied intent. The true background to the bombing is still unknown.¹⁷

On 27 October 1992, a delegation of NATO experts arrived in Budapest to prepare for the flight of NATO and British AWACS aircraft over Hungary and to discuss technical details. Expert talks were successfully concluded, and it became possible to start flights, which was also necessary due to the fighting on the southern border. The aircraft were controlled by the Hungarian civil and military air traffic control. In order to identify military air traffic, the Hungarian side provided to the AWACS aircraft the flight data of aircraft arriving from the territory of the former Yugoslavia. At the beginning of the mission, Hungary received a liaison officer from NATO and the United Kingdom. The purpose of the patrols was initially to control day-to-day airspace in Bosnia and Herzegovina for the safety of humanitarian flights, but later the activity was extended to nights and larger airspace as well.¹⁸

14 Cryptography from The Hague. Opinion of Dutch Foreign Minister Van den Broek on NATO enlargement. ANAH XIX-J-1-j 1992. 82. b. 26 February 1992.

15 The follow-up meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe in Helsinki took place from 24 March to 10 June 1992.

16 The text of the *Open Sky Treaty* was finalized in Vienna between 13 and 20 January 1992, signed by twenty-five states on 24 March 1992 in Helsinki. The Open Skies allows unarmed observation flights over the territory of States Parties. The first practice observation flight was conducted by Canada over Hungary.

17 See Sáringer 2018: 167. 24 September 1991.

18 The three-member NATO expert delegation in Budapest to prepare for the flight of NATO and

At the Helsinki Summit on 9–10 July 1992, József Antall met in person with several world leaders for the last time. The final document, *The Challenges of Change*, was published in Helsinki. Heads of State and Government declare the CSCE a regional agreement under Chapter 8 of the UN Charter. The Forum for Security Cooperation, the Office of the High Commissioner on National Minorities, the Economic Forum, and the Finance Committee were established. The position of the Secretary-General was decided by the Stockholm Council of Ministers (14–15 December 1992). The Heads of State and Government attending the July summit also decided that Budapest would be the next venue for the European Security and Cooperation Council summit.¹⁹ This also shows the international prestige and judgment of Hungary, the Hungarian government, and Prime Minister József Antall.

By 1992, views on the future were divided between and within the member states of the European Communities. In the spring of 1992, the view emerged that, in contrast to the already established German Europe (Austria, the Visegrád Three, Baltic States, Ukraine), a French Europe (Romania, Bulgaria, Mediterranean countries) should be created, among which Italy wanted to be a balancing factor. Among the twelve, there was a debate about the concept of ‘deepening’ or ‘widening’, vertical reinforcement or horizontal enlargement. The term ‘multi-speed Europe’ has emerged, with the full membership of the EFTA countries being set for the middle of the decade and the Visegrád countries projected for the end of the century.

In June 1992, the Lisbon European Council²⁰ set out the path to the European Union and the direction of the common foreign and security policy and set out the challenges of enlargement with reference to the Maastricht Treaty. In October in Birmingham, the presidency of the European Council strengthened economic and monetary cooperation, inter alia. At the end of the year, Edinburgh, Scotland, reviewed, among other things, the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty in each Member State and the possibilities for new member states to join.²¹

Due to the outcome of the Danish referendum,²² the Edinburgh Agreement gave Denmark four exceptions to the Maastricht Treaty so that Copenhagen could ratify it,

British AWACS aircraft over Hungary. ANAH XIX–J–1–j 1992. 82. b. 28 October 1992; Hungary authorized the patrol of AWACS aircraft in Hungarian airspace for the purpose of day-to-day control of airspace in Bosnia and Herzegovina and for the safety of humanitarian flights. ANAH XIX–J–1–j 1992. 82. b. 29 October 1992.

19 The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) was established at the *CSCE Summit of Heads of State and Government* in Budapest on 5–6 December 1994, and the document entitled *Towards a True Partnership in a New Era* was published in Budapest.

20 The Lisbon European Council took place on 26 and 27 June 1992.

21 The European Council’s session in Edinburgh took place between 11 and 12 December 1992, when, in addition to the above-mentioned ones, the application of the principle of subsidiarity, transparency, the promotion of economic recovery in Europe, the internal market, the free movement of persons, the common justice and home affairs, and internal migration were the topics.

22 In the Danish referendum of 2 June 1992, citizens voted against the ratification of the Treaty on European Union.

as this was the only way the Treaty could enter into force. Denmark was not obliged to adopt the euro. It did not join the Western European Union, did not participate in the Union's foreign and security policy or in the Union's military missions, and was exempted from certain obligations for home affairs harmonization.

The message of the European Council's exemptions for Denmark to the region and Budapest is that the twelve do not apply the principle of equal treatment to all members of European countries. The Danish referendum and the response to it reflected the uncertainty within the European Communities. All this, together with the concept of a multi-speed Europe, caused disappointment in Hungary and at the same time shattered the hopes of a close accession within two to three years, and the desires were replaced by the recognition of reality.

NATO decision makers have regarded the North Atlantic Cooperation Council as a forum for liaison and cooperation. In Brussels, Liaison Officer György Granasztói extended the invitation of Foreign Minister Géza Jeszenszky and Minister of Defence Lajos Für to NATO Secretary General Manfred Wörner in March 1992, but the main topic of discussion was the Russian and Ukrainian military situation.²³ In November, the NATO Permanent Council auditioned Ambassador György Granasztói, who described the security situation in Hungary and emphasized that:

the country has made an irrevocable commitment to Western, Euro-Atlantic integration. This is reflected in democratic institutions, the parliamentary system and the functioning of the market economy. However, the country alone is not able to implement the goal set, especially in an environment threatened by security risks, and the situation of minorities across the border is very sensitive to the Hungarian public.²⁴

The Atlantic Council of Canada held a seminar in Toronto on 20 November 1992, entitled *The Political and Military Dimensions of NATO*. The statements of Michael Legge, NATO's Deputy Secretary General for Defence Planning and Politics, and General Vigleik Eide, Chairman of NATO's Military Committee, were inconsistent, reflecting internal differences ahead of NATO's Foreign Ministers' meeting in December.

Michael Legge stressed the need for greater political adaptation to the changing security policy environment. It is the starting point for the organization's new strategic concept based on political and military approaches, a reassessment of the nature of possible future crises. Following the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, there was no danger of a comprehensive conflict; instead, a multifaceted, diverse

23 Report by Ambassador György Granasztói on his visit to NATO Secretary General Manfred Wörner. ANAH XIX-J-1-j 1992. 82. b. 9 March 1992.

24 Hearing of Ambassador György Granasztói at the NATO Permanent Council. ANAH XIX-J-1-j 1992. 82. b. 23 November 1992.

and difficult-to-predict conflict on the periphery of the federal system had to be reckoned with, which could take a political, military, economic, and social form.

He also called the possibility of the proliferation of missile technologies and weapons dangerous. NATO's primary goal is to preserve transatlantic consultation, provide protection against external aggression, and maintain Europe's strategic balance. He called the views on NATO's becoming a political organization a misunderstanding, as NATO has always played an important political role. However, the political elements that came to the fore as a result of the reduction in the risk of military conflict could not diminish the importance of the organization's military tasks.

The new types of insecurity and the recognition that NATO's security is inseparable from the security of Europe as a whole have been reflected in the emphasis on conflict prevention, crisis management, preventive diplomacy, and peacekeeping. NATO's coordination with European organizations and institutions (EC, CSCE, WEU) has been adapted to new political requirements. However, the increase in the membership of the CSCE and its relatively slow development have made it difficult for it to play a role in crisis management. The development of the security content of the EC and the WEU was also a function of the formation of the European political union. The new political goals would have been met by a new military structure based on more mobilizable, more flexible, smaller troops, which could also have reduced the need to rely on nuclear weapons but has not made it unnecessary. NATO did not have sufficient financial and expert resources to implement the cooperation and support required by the new partner countries. Emphasizing the importance of multilateral meetings for new partners, he suggested strengthening cooperation with NATO members on specific issues.

He hoped that the Secretariat of the Western European Union would move to Brussels to develop complementary goals, increase transparency and strengthen cooperation. On this basis, the WEU may in the future engage in activities that NATO is unable or unwilling to undertake. However, it was necessary to change the bad practice that the WEU is aware of NATO's aspirations, while the opposite was often not the case. As a negative example of the relationship between the two organizations, he cited their uncoordinated, often competing actions in peacekeeping activities in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Vigleik Eide called it essential to maintain the same level of effective and integrated defence capability. In contrast, Legge strongly stated that the primary goal of NATO's political engagement should not be to adapt quickly to uncertain changes in the international situation but to promote crisis planning and maintain a coordinated defence image in a coordinated manner. He was critical of the role of the UN, the CSCE, and the WEU in carrying out crisis management and peacekeeping missions that reflect a broader approach to security. He called the independence of the European defence pillar within NATO a meaningless concept. In his view,

the European and transatlantic pillars are inseparable elements of NATO's defence system. He called maintaining a North American presence an essential component of international security.

According to Jamie Shea, NATO's Central and Eastern European Affairs Officer, it is inconceivable for NATO to establish a link with the new democracies similar to the EC's associate membership, as the convergence of some countries would be rejected by other states, further destabilizing the region. In the light of the unpredictable internal processes of the new democracies, their membership would weaken NATO's cohesion. In this area, he called 'long engagement before marriage' essential. Referring to Spain's accession to NATO in 1992, he stated that in the midst of today's realities, the framework for accession must be established first, and only then can it be a matter of gaining membership. For the 'bridal' relationship, the NACC offers a meaningful framework for cooperation. He suggested that this forum could effectively contribute to neutralizing crisis hotspots. However, increasing financial resources are needed to meet the growing demand for practical forms of cooperation offered by the NACC in Central and Eastern Europe (seminars, conventions, transfer of other expertise).

In his opinion, in the short term, the relationship between the countries of the region and NATO could be positively influenced not only by providing a substantive exchange of views of the NACC but also by increasing its practical functioning. He identified joint action in the areas of arms control, arms control initiatives, nuclear security, and refugees in the new European security system as possible areas for short-term cooperation. In the light of the growing demand for peacekeeping missions, he mentioned the overflights of AWACS aircraft over Hungary as a positive example. Cooperation within the NACC would serve as the 'servant years' of NATO membership. With the further development of the CSCE, it is conceivable how the CSCE can become an economic institution and the Council of Europe a human rights one, and in this way NATO can transform into a comprehensive institution in the security sphere.²⁵

At the 46th session of the UN General Assembly, Hungary was elected a non-permanent member of the Security Council for two years starting from 1 January 1992. The work of the UN Mission in New York is also uninteresting in this respect. The sixth UN Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the former Egyptian Deputy Prime Minister, took office on 1 January 1992. The term of office of the Secretary-General began at the Security Council Summit on 31 January 1992. On the basis of the summit's mandate, the Secretary-General drew up a report entitled *Agenda for Peace*, which set out the directions in which Boutros-Ghali envisioned the further development of the world organization.

25 See the summary report by Canadian Ambassador Kálmán Kulcsár. ANAH XIX-J-1-j 1992. 82. b. 17 December 1992.

The South Slavic crisis was a key issue on the Security Council's agenda, but both the European Communities and the CSCE have proved unsuccessful in their peace efforts. Thirteen Security Council resolutions were issued in ten months, ranging from the imposition of an arms embargo on Yugoslavia, the deployment of UNPROFOR, the imposition of general economic and other sanctions on Serbia and Montenegro to the opening of the Sarajevo airport.

In several cases, the Hungarian mission succeeded in ensuring that the proposals reflecting Hungarian interests were included in the wording of the Security Council's decisions so that the political settlement of the South Slavic crisis be in line with the principles of the CSCE, which are: ensuring the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the rights of national minorities, the unacceptability of attempts to forcibly change borders, an immediate ban on forced evictions, and attempts to change the ethnic composition of the population.

In the wake of the South Slavic crisis, the world community has recognized that neither the United Nations nor Europe has the appropriate tools and institutions to prevent or eradicate such crises.²⁶

In conclusion, as presented above, by 1992, opinions on the future had been divided between the emerging view that a French Europe should be created as opposed to the already established German Europe (and among them Italy as a balancing factor). A debate was launched about the concept of 'deepening' or 'widening' and about vertical reinforcement or horizontal enlargement. The term 'multi-speed Europe' was emerging too. The Danish referendum for the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty (rejected by the Danish voters) and the European Council's response to it reflected the uncertainty within the European Communities. These caused disappointment in Hungary and at the same time shattered the hopes of a close accession within two to three years, and the desires were replaced by the recognition of reality. For this reason, we can say that in terms of Hungary's Euro-Atlantic integration, Hungarian diplomacy had to face the procrastinating reality of Brussels. During the period of the first Orbán government, Hungary became a full member of NATO in 1999 and of the European Union in 2004.

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