



Immanence, Ethics and Dystopia in *The Lobster* by Yorgos Lanthimos

Kevser Akyol Oktan

Ondokuz Mayıs University, Samsun (Turkey)

E-Mail: kevser.akyoloktan@omu.edu.tr

Abstract. The article discusses *The Lobster* (2015) by Yorgos Lanthimos in connection with the concepts of transcendence and immanence, morality and ethics. This film is a dystopia that critically reveals the relationship between modernity and morality and draws attention with its objections to transcendental moral values. Therefore, in this study, the film is the subject of a discussion mainly focusing on the loss of control of modern individuals over their own lives under the pressure of transcendent values and moral systems that produce hierarchy. The film is evaluated on the axis of Spinoza’s approach to immanence ethics. The distinction between morality and ethics, which stands out in Spinoza’s philosophy of immanence, and the association of morality with transcendence and ethics with immanence form the basis of the analysis of the film. Criticisms of transcendence and morality are hidden in the ironic style that is based on Cartesian oppositions such as nature–culture, good–evil, mind–body, woman–man, rule-illegal, similarity–difference in the film. In addition, the emphasis on the lack of emotion in the film is an important part of the critical style of the film in terms of the role that Spinoza assigns to the affects in the context of activating the conatus.

Keywords: transcendence, immanence, ethics, Spinoza, cinema, dystopia.

Introduction

“Transcendence” and “immanence” are among the basic concepts of Spinoza’s philosophy. The philosopher’s approaches to good and truth, morality and ethics are also understandable with the concepts of transcendence and immanence. According to Spinoza, while morality is mentioned with laws, prohibitions and restrictions as a product of an understanding that establishes a hierarchy in the context of the Cartesian tradition of thought, ethics challenges the foundations laid down by morality as a result of seeing man and nature, God and the universe, mind and body as identical and one. While morality is a product of

the tradition of transcendent thought, immanence naturally includes ethics in Spinoza's philosophy (cf. Özcan 2020, 12). This relationship, which reflects the Spinozist view between transcendence and immanence, has a key position in defining dystopian narratives and interpreting the discourses produced in these narratives. Because utopias present an ideal world design and limit the expectations about sociality within the idea of a transcendent order. The most basic criticism of utopias is that they have a closed structure that limits different possibilities through the definition of the "ideal" (Jameson 2009, 234). Dystopias, on the other hand, came to the fore as a criticism of the transcendental ideals in utopias. Dystopias make the transcendent certainties offered by modernity doubtful, and may show an orientation towards an immanence where awareness is the main purpose.

The Lobster (2015), directed by Yorgos Lanthimos, one of the directors of the Greek Strange Wave, has a dystopian narrative. I have found that the film foregrounds subjects such as transcendental values, the problem of good and evil, and the phenomenon of happiness, and that this can be viewed in connection with Spinoza's understanding of immanence. Therefore, the following analysis is based on Spinoza's approach to the discussions of transcendence and immanence, morality and ethics. The fact that the orientation to immanence in the philosophy tradition started with Spinoza and that Spinoza took a central position in the discussions of an ethics of immanence were also decisive in this choice.

The Lobster was discussed, in different studies, in various contexts such as mythological elements that support the status quo in dystopian narratives (Ilić 2021); sociological analysis of the discontents caused by civilization based on the question of "how to be human" (Balçı 2017); Foucault's views on power and the subject (Diker 2019); gender and queer theory (Laurie and Stark 2021). Considering the film's critical attitude towards authoritarian structures, I consider it important to open up for discussion with what kind of criticism the moral values that produce hierarchy in cinema, in particular for this film, come to the fore. Based on the ethics of immanence as a basic point of view, this study aims to contribute to this discussion by considering the film in the axis of ethics and morality. I will examine the plot, the characteristics of the characters, the dialogues, and the metaphorical narrative elements in the film after a brief survey of Spinoza's views.

Spinoza and the Ethics of Immanence

Spinoza's perception of immanence is related to the interpretation that he brings to the idea of God and existence. Before Spinoza, there was the idea of an external, transcending relationship between God and existence, nature and man, mind and body, both in scholastic thought and in the dualist views based on Descartes. God was believed to be beyond existential experience. Similarly, although man was considered as an entity that has an influence on nature and was affected by nature, he/she was in an anomalistic position from nature. Nevertheless, the mind also was conceived as a separate essence from the body. There was a hierarchy among all. The mind was regarded as superior to the body just as humans were seen superior to nature. Spinoza's understanding of immanence ([1677] 2021) defies the dualist logic based on hierarchy by stating that all existence consists of a single substance.

Spinozist immanence has evaluated humankind in the position of both the subject and object of life at the same time. This kind of ethical understanding is also a challenge to the concept of morality, which is the basis of transcendence. It challenges a moral system that operates through the laws, prohibitions and rules that transcendence reveals on the basis of the hierarchy established at the level of mind-body, human-nature, God-universe (Özcan 2020, 12). According to Deleuze's interpretation of Spinoza, "ethics which is to say a typology of the modes of existence, replaces the Morality, which always refers existence to transcendent values. Morality is judgement of God, the system of judgement. But ethics overthrows the system of judgement. The opposition of values (Good – Evil) is supplanted by the qualitative difference of modes of existence (good – bad)" (1988, 23). Spinoza's approach is related to the proposal to move from the order established by the proposition of the moral laws of transcendence to the order of relations and connection. According to him, "therefore, he does not exist for the sake of an end, so neither does he act for the sake of an end; of his existence and his action, there is neither origin nor end. Wherefore, a cause that is called the final is nothing else but human desire, in so far as it is considered as the origin or cause of anything" (Spinoza 2021, 311). In other words, according to Spinoza's transcendent approach, "it is nothing more than a 'prejudice' or a sign of ignorance to think that God imposes an erection on things or directs all nature towards a purpose that ends in human happiness" (Rutherford 2020, 84).

Another issue that makes Spinoza's understanding of immanence important is that Spinoza's philosophy is based on an ethical understanding based on

“multitude” (*multitudo*). Spinoza primarily interprets the concept of multitude as philosophical immanence. For example, the fact that it is philosophical immanence is related to the multiplicity of singularities such as body and mind. Because what reveals the existence of thought is the relationships in which the body creates with other singularities (Spinoza 2021, 124, 126–128, 131). In the political context, Spinoza deals with the concept of multitude (2000a, 3–4, 6, 2000b, 59) as a crowd stuck in superstitions. However he also emphasizes its potential to trigger transformation (2008, 87). The philosopher proposes a consensus instead of the idea of social contract and collectiveness instead of individuality, and thus multitude is interpreted as a founding force (Negri 2004, 17).

One of the important elements of Spinozist immanence ethics is related to the “balance between activity and passivity.” According to Spinoza, “finite beings are neither completely active nor completely passive. Rather, their activity is caused both by the action of other things on them and by their own power of acting, that is, by the immanent power of God or nature, which acts through each thing” (Armstrong 2013, 15–16). As Jonas Hans points out in his reference to Spinoza, our capacity to be influenced is likely to expose us to destructive passions that despicable us, but still “only by being sensitive can life be active, only by being exposed can it be autonomous” (Hans 1973, 278).

Transcendence and Immanence in *The Lobster*

In the film, the plot of which takes place in an unspecified time, the individuals who are alone for any reason (such as separation, death) are taken to a hotel and are expected to be a couple with a suitable person within forty-five days. If they fail to become a couple, they are transformed into an animal of their choice and released into the wild, given to the zoo, or given in the care of a family member. The fact that this system, in which individuals are involved without their consent, operates with absurd rules, is presented with irony in the film, and constitutes a criticism of the transcendent moral values system in the society. This system is transcendental because its source is not in the interest of individual existence and experience; it is a structure that is outside the individual and produces hierarchy. As Spinoza stated, there is a moral system that is the result of thinking about existence in individualities, establishing a hierarchy between them, and transcendence.

In the film, the most fundamental element of transcendence is related to a moral system that works with binary contrasts. There are dual classifications in the hotel such as right and wrong, appropriate and inappropriate, things to do

and not to do, women and men, even heterosexuals and homosexuals (when the main character of the film, David, wants to register as bisexual, this request is rejected). Accordingly, people are classified as married couples living in the city, single-wanderers living in the forest and those who fail to become a couple, converted into animals and released into the forest. There are rules set by various authorities for being a couple, living as a couple, and being a single-wanderer. Within this system, the transcending qualities of the dualist structure, which produces the kind of hierarchy that Spinoza mentions, are shaped by a network of rules. The things that are mandatory and that are forbidden can be determined with clear boundaries. The discrimination between nature–human and mind–body is the main determinant of this moral system. In this system, people must live in the cultural codes of city life, separate from nature.

For Spinoza, the state of nature and the social situation (in other words, nature–culture) are parallel, not opposite. Spinoza, like Thomas Hobbes, talks about the natural state of man, but Hobbes defines the natural state and social situation as separate structures. According to Spinoza, the natural state and social state are holistic structures that merge into “being human” (Strauss 1965, 272). In this case, assignments brought to the natural state of man as an external element with the logic of a kind of control mechanism and the moral rules become problematic. For Spinoza, man is not completely free in the case of nature, contrary to what Hobbes suggests. Because freedom is associated with the purification of passive passions according to Spinoza, and in the case of nature human is largely influenced by fear which is a feeling of passiveness (Kaya 2017, 181). Fear makes people passive both in the state of nature and in social life because it is an element that restricts the freedom of thought. In both cases, man needs the emotions that make his *conatus* effective. According to Spinoza, “everything, in so far as it is in itself, endeavors to persist in its own being” (2021, 211). To endeavor to persist in its own being, which Spinoza refers to as *conatus*, is related to the effectiveness of the emotions.

The nature–culture opposition in the film becomes evident with the distinction between those who live in the city as a couple and those who wander alone in the forest. In this contrast, there is no freedom for those who travel alone or for those who live in the city. In both fields, concerns and fears, framed by moral rules that will distract life from active emotions, are dominant. These fears and concerns are fed by the hierarchy established between social and natural ones. As Spinoza mentioned, based on the connection between nature and social, not the hierarchy of the social over the natural, it is possible to turn to the emotions that make people active and be liberated.

Just as nature is presented in the nature-society opposition as an indicator of being out of society in the film, the mind also takes place separately from the body, and the idea that the mind has/should have control over the body constitutes one of the basic elements of the narrative. Because, the rules determined by the authority (the mind that is the source of these rules) are there to control the desires of the body. People have left the control over their bodies to the collective mind, which is under the control of transcendent values. In the film, this element that connects the body with sin and evil and reminds us of the forms of belief and thought that attribute a superior role in showing the right way to reason is criticized in an ironic manner.

It is understood that there is almost no indication of the mood of the characters in the film. This is related to the hierarchy established by the aforementioned dualist structure. The system of rules guided by the mind has also suppressed emotions. The ironic tone in the film is also an objection to the hierarchy established between reason and emotion or intuition.

The ironic structure of the human-animal duality in the film also reflects the criticism to the human-centered approach. The main indicator of this criticism is that the transformation of humans into animals is seen as a punishment. Although transitivity between forms of existence may seem like a non-uniform, fluid life form, the state of punishment provides a contribution to the production of hierarchy. Depending on the fact that everyone wants to become similar animals, the information that some animals are endangered, regardless of whether they are suitable for the nature of existence, the release of all kinds of animals such as pigs, ostriches, peacocks, flamingos to the same geography, and the fact that animals are shown only in and out of the scene aimlessly throughout the film can also be evaluated in this context. The director's ironic emphasis on humans and the alienating atmosphere he creates reminds the viewer that man is only one of the forms of existence in nature. However, Spinoza rejected these dualities and saw human not as the master of nature, but as only one of the modes of existence. Spinozist immanence has brought criticism to both rigid fatalism and human centrist arrogance by objecting to both approaches that see human beings as objects or subjects of life. Although is not completely outside the perspective of humanism due to the conditions of the period in which he lived, it should be accepted that there is a criticism of the hierarchical position of man in Spinoza's emphasis on causality in man.

One of the dualist highlights in the film is related to similarity and difference. People need to be similar to each other in order to be a couple. Their expectations

for the person they choose to be a couple are shaped by being similar to them or not. The identification of similarities and differences with myopia, pelvis, lameness, and nosebleeds is also part of the ironic narrative form in the film. Reducing the differences, which have an important role in the process of subjectivity construction, to physical defects, can be considered as a critical view to the subject-centred approach of modernity that affirms the construction of subjectivity as if it were a sacred duty.

On the other hand, some characters who do not want to become animals try to establish similarities with artificial indicators between them and the person they find convenient. For example, a character artificially bleeds his own nose because the girl with whom he wants to be a couple often has a nosebleed. It is seen that none of the relationships which are established in this way have emotional elements such as sincerity, love, and trust. The aforementioned artificiality and in-sincereness are underlined especially in the scene where single-wanderers raid the hotel manager's room. They are testing this couple's love for each other in order to draw attention to the hypocrisy of the system. For the test, they asked the man the following question: "If this woman dies, can you manage on your own?". This question implies a notion that a person will be killed, and that the survivor will be decided according to his ability to live alone. The man tries to suggest that he is better at living alone. He is given a gun to prove his determination and is asked to kill his wife. And he pulls the trigger to prove that he would be better off living without her because he'd rather have her die than him. Because the gun is empty, she doesn't die, and the rebels leave. Their goal is to prove that their relationship is not based on intimacy and to leave them with the unrest that will occur between them.

Although the single-wanderers live in the forest, rebelling against the moral rules imposed by the system, they are not actually free either. The hierarchical and authoritarian system they created within themselves turned into an oppressive structure, which is the opposite of the system they had fled, but at the same rate, perhaps more brutally. Although it was obligatory to be a couple in the city, it is mandatory here to be alone and run away from all sorts of flirting or relationship. In both systems, we encounter fear as a determinant emotion. As in Spinoza's interpretations of emotions, fear negatively affects the conatus/the effort to maintain and improve life in the direction of preventing action.

The Problem of Good and Evil

According to Deleuze's comments, Spinoza's immanence approach treats the good-bad problem as an ethical issue, not a moral one (1992, 261). Because before, there was an understanding of good versus bad in teleology, in which what should be done is prescribed, but Spinoza put forward an understanding of good versus evil that is explained not by teleology, but by causality. Causality is related to think of good and bad in a relationship that comes from the unity of mind, body, nature, desires and emotions, beyond moral norms (Kılıç 2007, 163). According to him, as in Descartes' philosophy, to think of man as a being composed of separate substances as mind and body means hierarchizing between mind and emotions, ignoring the parallelism of emotions with the functioning of the mind and underestimating the role of human being in being active or passive (Spinoza 2021, 195–197). This displays a transcending process and the pressure-generating power of the moral system. However, Spinoza defends the integrity of the body and mind and gives emotions an important role in the liberation of by gaining the consciousness of the existence of human (2021, 419–425). According to Spinoza, "whatsoever increases or diminishes, helps or hinders the power of activity in our body, the idea thereof increases or diminishes, helps or hinders the power of thought in our mind." (2021, 215). In this sense, desires also have a positive function for Spinoza. Through reinterpreting the desire on a constructive and productive dimension, he challenges the superiority of dualist thought in the face of emotions. For Spinoza, reason is also important in discovering human causality, but it is quite different from the Cartesian thought that he refers to as mind. The mind is in a communicative unity with the body which includes mental emotions and intuitiveness (2021, 423–424, 447, 450). In Spinoza, this effort to understand the causality of human emotions is the result of "conatus." It can be stated that Spinoza proposed a kind of ethics for "self-realization" (Güngör 2015, 132–133). In short, the phrases such as good and evil, sin and goodness are the product of transcending moral values that make consciousness open to illusion according to Spinoza, and perceptions of good and evil should be related to understanding the causal roots of emotions.

Good or bad is not absolute for Spinoza. According to him terms good and bad, "indicate no positive quality in things regarded in themselves but are merely modes of thinking or notions which we form from the comparison of things one with another. Thus, one and the same thing can be at the same time good, bad, and indifferent" (Spinoza 2021, 313). For Spinoza, being beneficial to the existence

of good human; if it is bad, it is about the things that prevent reaching the good (2021, 315). According to Bumin's Spinoza interpretation, "a good man is a free, intelligent, or powerful person who tries to establish his relationships in a way that is useful to the essence of his/her nature and with what is appropriate. The bad person is the slave, weak or fool who leaves his/her encountering to coincidences is only affected by them and complains about it or guilt-riddled" (2010, 77).

In *The Lobster*, there are clear boundaries between good and evil: marrying is good, being alone is bad. However, it is notable that there are no causal connections to good and evil in humans and no emotion to help discover these connections. This leads to the questioning of the good-bad dilemma. In addition, the director's presentation style leaves the audience in a dilemma about the preferences for this good-evil classification. For example, there are some shows at the hotel about why it is important for them to be a couple. There are theatrical demonstrations that focus on issues such as a woman is raped if her husband isn't there and a man can suffocate and die alone at home if he does not have a wife. This absurd narrative style evokes bad at first, creating a good expectation from the one of opposing this bad system; then, by using the bad elements in it, he objects to the assumption that the opposite of a bad example will be good and to the way of thinking through such oppositions. In other words, he opposes the utopian understanding. This is in line with Spinoza's idea that nothing will be absolutely good or bad.

For Spinoza, there are three main emotions: joy, grief, and desire. The others are manifestations of these three. Rather than defining emotions such as hope, fear, joy, grief, compassion, hatred, joy, anger, trust, jealousy, and love, it is important to discover the adequate causality (Kılıç 2007, 165, 167–168). Spinoza mentions that there are two states of these emotions: *passio* and *actio*. Emotion as *passio* is something that the mind is passively exposed to and has to endure. As for *actio*, emotion is related to the things that makes the mind effective. However, if the mind has the appropriate causal (adequate) knowledge of emotion as *passio*, it can switch from being passive and being exposed towards being effective; it can switch to taking action (cited by Hünler 2003, 59). For Spinoza, the emotion that drives consciousness to activity as *actio* is joy, while it is grief that prevents it from action. Joy is good, and grief is bad. Conatus is the determinant factor in both emotions. Therefore, it is necessary to pursue good encounters and active emotions that make one active. Because understanding the effective emotions and the causality of these feelings means getting stronger and liberated (Kılıç 2007, 172).

In the film, it is noteworthy that people are in a passive state under the influence of transcendental codes. People get into acting only with survival instinct because there are no other emotions for them that will activate them about making their life better. At the beginning of the film, the words we hear from the voice over for the main character, David, give the first clues about emotional deprivation: “He didn’t know that the first reaction of numerous people when they understood that others don’t love them anymore is crying.” In addition, the expression of David, “it was harder to pretend as if he has emotion inside him although there isn’t any than pretending as if there isn’t any emotion inside him although there is” underlines the emotional deprivation. This phrase reminds us of the approach of the film *Pity* (*Oiktos*, directed by Babis Makridis, 2018) which is one of the films that exemplify the Greek Weird Wave movement on the subject of emotions. *Pity* also focuses on a character who lives as a performance through imitation of a sense of mourning Erdoğan Tuğran (2021, 452–453), who discusses the movie in the context of Spinoza’s views on emotions and Ulus Baker’s sociology of emotions, states that the character of the movie is far from encounters that will open the body to positive emotions. Also, on the axis of Spinoza’s views, the author interprets the character’s lack of emotion as not being able to feed the mind, which is a whole with the body, and therefore reducing the conatus. In the context of lack of emotion, the similarity between the characters of *Pity* and *The Lobster* films is quite distinct.

The effect of emotion on increasing conatus is emphasized when David decided for radical changes at two points. The first is the moment when the woman, known as insensitive and he thought they could be a couple when they were at the hotel, kills the brother of David who turned into a dog. After this event, the character is seen to be deeply emotional (cries) and the character escapes into the forest in the belief that he will be freer than the oppressive environment in which he is located. The second one is the moment when he feels emotional intimacy with a woman in the woods. After David falls in love, he establishes a more peaceful relationship with the nature, and David’s facial expressions change, bringing attention to relatively emotional gestures. At the same time, David and the woman he is in love break the rules of nature when they dance by listening to a musical instrument and move in sync in a pattern in which harmony is denied. As a part of this synchronization, they even develop a language between them that only they understand. It is the joy that drives them to this kind of orderless action, given by their unique sense of love. In the Spinozist context, the joy that activates their conatus comes with a sense of love.

This kind of emotion leads David and the woman he loves to run away from the laws of the jungle that forbid them from being together. Although the city represents another authoritarian order and it is understood that the characters are still not in a state of complete liberation at the cognitive level by trying to stay together through similarity, these superficial moments of breakdown in the film also arise with the elements of emotion that make individuals relatively emotional. At this point, the creative function that Spinoza imposes on desires can be pointed out. The positive role which Spinoza attributes to desires is also seen in David's choice of lobster for transform. Because David says he chose lobster because it lives long, is sexually productive throughout its life, and lives in the sea. In these statements of David, an effort to maintain his conatus, that is, to maintain his life and to make it active, is felt with a Spinozist approach, and an affective connection with the lobster draws attention.

Happiness

Spinoza's ethics of immanence is mainly related to questions such as "how to make a good life possible," and "what is necessary to be happy and maintain this happiness." According to Spinoza, the aim of philosophy is to reach inner freedom and be happy rather than gaining knowledge (Fransez 2004, 126). In other words, Spinoza philosophizes in search of happiness (Hünler 2003, 8). However, in Spinoza's immanence ethic, happiness is not a destination to be reached, but the process of actuating conatus. In a sense, it is not the goal to be achieved by virtue, but the virtue itself. Therefore, happiness in the immanence ethics is not related to hedonistic satisfaction. Spinoza associates happiness with inner freedom. He seeks inner freedom in the emotional relationality that determines existence as a part of an inclusive whole. This emotional relationality is also possible only with the rich (and revealing multiplicity) relationship established with other beings (Armstrong 2013, 17). According to Deleuze's Spinoza interpretation, "the free, strong and reasonable man is in principle fully defined by his possession of a power of action and the presence in him of adequate ideas and active affections; the slave and the weak man, on the other hand, have only those passions that derive from their inadequate ideas, and cut them off from their power of action" (1992, 261–262). Therefore, Spinoza is understood to treat freedom, emotional relationality, and effectiveness in parallel to each other.

Spinoza seeks inner freedom and the possibilities of a happy life in "freedom of thought," as well as exploring the causation behind emotions and turning to

emotions that will make human active. Spinoza was noted as one of the first defenders of freedom of thought and expression with the emphasis on “freedom” in his work *Theological-Political Review* (Bumin 2010, 69). According to Spinoza, the opportunity of reasoning freely and judgment is a natural element of the effort to maintain existence. For that reason, it is possible to think of freedom/freedom of thought as the “conatus” of the political organism. Because restricting freedom is an obstacle to the insistence on maintaining existence. In addition, according to Spinoza, the lack of freedom of thought is a situation that contradicts the reason for the existence of the state. The main purpose of the state is to ensure freedom.

In *The Lobster* people do not seem happy in general, happiness is not the main motivation of life. People’s only motivation is to live by the rules and be able to be a couple. Spinoza believes that a happy life is only possible through the discovery of causality between emotions. According to him, when people discover these causalities, they will move to the state of action that is good for them and they will be happy. However, the system of transcending values is an obstacle to achieving real happiness since it is based on teleology, not causality. It appears that the characters are not pursuing such a causal relationship. They have ignored this causality so much that they have lost the feelings which they have. They act only with the motivation of avoiding pain.

Exploring the relationality between emotions is a prerequisite for freedom in Spinoza. In the film the absence of emotions facilitates obedience. People obey unresponsively even in the most difficult moments. Even when David is asked to dig up his own grave and lie down in it, or even to throw dirt on it with his own hands, he appears to do whatever is asked of him without showing any sign of objection. On the other hand, David’s first apparent emotional response was over the death of his brother turned into a dog, and his escape from the hotel took place after that. It can be thought that attention is drawn to the activating aspect of emotions in this way. A similar situation can be said for the scene where the woman John fell in love with in the forest, after she went blind, drew a knife to their leader.

Consequently, Spinoza’s philosophy of immanence has a determinant role in the distinction between morality and ethics, as well as bringing a different interpretation of humanity and existence. According to him, morality is the product of a transcendent structure that imprisons existence in hierarchies and operates within the framework of teleology, ignoring causality between affects. The ethics of immanency is related to a system of thought which is based on relationality/unity, suggests that exploring the casual connections between emotions, and

correlates freedom and happiness to heading towards emotions that make humans active and avoiding emotions that prevent conatus from being active.

With its dystopian narrative structure, *The Lobster* offers a rich content that allows us to discuss this relationship between morality and ethics. The most basic feature of the film is that it has a critical attitude towards authoritarian institutionalized structures and utopian perspectives that affirms certainties. The film, which has an ironic narrative about family and being a couple, draws attention to the loss of control of the modern individual over his/her own life under the pressure of transcendent values. The critique of transcendence and morality, which is reflected through binary oppositions such as mind-body, woman-man, rule-illegal, is basically presented in the context of nature-culture opposition. In the film, city life and the hotel which is a sort of its extension and which can be regarded as a kind of closure area and nature, namely, forest life are compared. The aforementioned duality which has been presented in an ironic style is not only an objection to Cartesian dualist logic but also reflects Spinoza's visions within the framework of the natural state and natural right. In other words, it is noted that there is no freedom in the state of nature/forest as in city life and that the element of fear is significant. In the film, it is underlined that the order of absurd rules/assignments which stands out in the subject matter of nature-social opposition, is not enough to maintain the ideal order as expected. However, as an extension of nature-social opposition in the film, the opposition of good and bad is also a criticism element. There is no moral opposition in the form of good and evil in nature for Spinoza; there are ethical differences (Deleuze 1992, 261). In the film, definitions such as that being a couple is good and being alone is bad; the elements such as reducing the differences between individuals to physical imperfections such as being myopic and lame means an objection to the opposition between good and bad. The clarity of the boundaries of good and evil can actually be considered as a metaphorical expression of the fact that good and evil cannot be absolute. Within this context, the lack of an ideal in the film and the fact that the viewer is not directed to a clear idea, this ambivalence also conforms to the open-ended, semantic, fluid nature of immanence.

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